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Reporting by secured lenders
Under another provision, secured lenders who acquire
an interest in the property in full or partial satisfaction of the
debt (or have reason to know the property was abandoned)
are required to file a Form 1099-A with IRS and furnish a
statement to the debtor.40 If the borrower is personally liable
for repayment of the debt, the Form 1099-A is to state the
fair market value of the property at the time the interest is
acquired.41 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, the proceeds of sale on foreclosure,
execution or other sale are considered to be the fair market
value of the property.42
The 1995 regulations make it clear that a financial entity
is not required to file both a Form 1099-A and a Form
1099-C (showing discharge of indebtedness) for the same
debtor.43 The filing requirements for secured lenders are
satisfied if, in lieu of filing a Form 1099-A, a Form 1099-C
is filed.44
In conclusion
The new regulations, while effective only for discharges
after December 21, 1996,45 will bring substantially greater
certainty to this area. The facts and circumstances approach
(with three identifiable events) of the temporary regulations
left a substantial burden on creditors to ascertain when
discharge had occurred. Under the final regulations, the list
of eight identifiable events is an exclusive list.46
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. Although the IRS was sent a notice of the
claims bar date, the IRS failed to file a claim in the case
until 21 months after the bar date due to a mistake by an
IRS agent. The IRS filed a request to file the late claim
based on excusable neglect. The court allowed the claim
because the wording of the notice was not completely clear
and because the claim was filed before the plan was
confirmed. Matter of Papp International, Inc., 189 B.R.
939 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
DISCHARGE. The debtors had timely filed their tax
returns for 1990. In October 1991, the debtors filed for
Chapter 13 and the case continued for 169 days until it was
dismissed in April 1992. In September 1993, the IRS
assessed the debtors for unpaid taxes for 1990. The
assessment occurred more than 240 days before the instant
bankruptcy case was filed. The IRS argued that, under
Section 108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h), the intervening
Chapter 13 case tolled the provisions in Sections 507(a)(8)
and 523(a)(8)(B) which provide that taxes due more than
three years prior to the bankruptcy filing were
dischargeable. The court held that I.R.C. § 108(c) and
I.R.C. § 6503(h) apply only to nonbankruptcy law limitation
periods and that the 1990 taxes were dischargeable.  In re
Gore, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,069 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1995).
CONTRACTS
EXCUSE. The defendant was a grain farm partnership
which contracted with the the plaintiff to sell 300,000
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bushels of corn to the plaintiff. A hail storm destroyed most
of the defendant's corn crop such that the defendant was
able to ship only 70,000 bushels. The parties attempted
negotiations for the remainder of the contract amount but
did not reach any settlement. The defendant purchased some
corn on the market and resold it to the plaintiff under the
contract but eventually failed to supply the entire contract
amount. The plaintiff sued for damages resulting from its
purchase of the remaining amount from other sources at a
price higher than the contract price. The defendant argued
that the contract was limited to corn grown by the defendant
and that the hail storm excused performance of the contract.
The court found that the contract contained no language
restricting the source of the corn except that the corn be
grown in the continental United States. Therefore, the court
held that the source of the corn was not an essential element
of the contract and the defendant was liable for the full
300,000 bushels. ConAgra, Inc. v. Bartlett Partnership,
540 N.W.2d 333 (Neb. 1995).
REJECTION. The plaintiff was a potato grower who
contracted with the defendant, a manufacturer of potato
chips, for the sale of chipping potatoes to the defendant.
The contract required that the potatoes produce chips with
at least #1 or #2 color on the 1978 Snack Food Association
"Fry Color Chart." The plaintiff sent samples to the
defendant who rejected the potatoes because the resulting
chips did not meet the color standard. Several more loads
were sent and each was rejected for the same reason. The
color determination was made by the defendant's employees
based on a visual inspection. The plaintiff had some
potatoes tested with an Agtron machine, a photo electric
refraction tester, and some of the potatoes tested within the
#2 range but some did not. The court found that the use of
visual testing was the norm for the industry at the time of
the contract; therefore, the failure of the defendant to use
the Agtron machine for testing was not a breach of the
contract. The court held that the failure of the potatoes to
meet the color requirement expressly included in the
contract was a substantial impairment of the contract and
justified the defendant's refusal to accept any of the
plaintiff's potatoes. Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods, Inc.,
903 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. N.Y. 1995).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
DAIRY FARM. The petitioner began construction of a
factory dairy farm and at the first inspection by the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA), the petitioner
had stated that the farm would have over four thousand
cows. The OEPA sent a letter to the petitioner requiring a
permit for the construction of waste treatment facilities at
the farm. The petitioner refused to comply with the request,
arguing that it had reduced the number of anticipated cows
to 400 and was eligible for the small farm exception to the
permit requirement. However, the petitioner did not
decrease the size of the facilities, including the waste
treatment facilities. The state Environmental Board of
Review (EBR) held a hearing and issued an order denying
the exception and requiring the petitioner to obtain a permit.
The court held that the exception applied only if the
petitioner's facilities could support a maximum of less than
1000 "animal units" (with one cow equaling 1.4 animal
units).  The court found that the EBR's decision failed to
identify the facts which supported its decision. The EBR
decision was found to merely restate the evidence presented
which was often contradictory as to whether the facility
would support more than 714 cows. The EBR decision was
reversed and remanded for specific findings of fact as to
whether the petitioner's facility would support more than
714 cows. Red Hill Farm Trust v. Schregardus, 656
N.E.2d 1010 (Ohio App. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
GRAZING PERMITS. The defendants had obtained a
permit to graze cattle on national forest land. A portion of
the land was burned in a forest fire and the Forest Service
prohibited any grazing on the burned portion until reseeding
could be accomplished. The defendants complied for one
year but began grazing the second year in violation of the
Forest Service's order. The Forest Service revoked the
defendants' permit and, after the defendants continued to
graze cattle on the land, assessed the defendants for
unauthorized grazing on the land. The defendants argued
that the federal government did not own the land because
the land was transferred to Nevada, under the "equal footing
doctrine," when Nevada became a state. The court held that
the "equal footing doctrine" did not apply to land within
federally owned land in the state but referred to political
equality with the other states. The court also rejected the
defendants' argument that the years of grazing permits
created a vested right to graze on the land. Finally, the court
rejected any "necessity" defense because the defendants
failed to show that the grazing was necessary to protect
themselves or their cattle. United States v. Gardner, 903
F. Supp. 1394 (D. Nev. 1995).
MEAT INSPECTION. The AMS has adopted as final
regulations removing the "B" maturity (30-42 months of
age) carcasses with slight or small marbling degrees from
the Choice and Select grades and moving them to the
Standard grade. 61 Fed. Reg. 2891 (Jan. 30, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
LOANS WITH BELOW MARKET INTEREST
RATES-ALM § 6.01[1][a].* Certiorari has been requested
in the U.S. Supreme Court in the following case. In 1980,
the taxpayers transferred stock to trusts for the taxpayers’
children in exchange for promissory notes with 6 percent
interest. In 1981, the taxpayers made loans to two of the
trusts with no interest charged. The IRS considered the first
transactions as gifts to the extent the interest rate was less
than 11.5 percent and the second transactions as gifts to the
extent the interest rate was less than 12 percent in 1981,
10.6 in 1982 and 8.6 percent in 1983. The taxpayers argued
that the test rate for both transactions was the 6 percent safe
harbor rate of I.R.C. § 483. The trial and appellate courts
agreed with the holding of Krabbenhoft v. Comm’r, 939
F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991) and held that I.R.C. § 483 applies
to the entire tax code but did not apply to valuation of gifts
with interest rates below the market rate. As to the second
transaction, the taxpayers argued that the IRS’s retroactive
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application of News Release 84-60 for gifts made before
1984 was improper. The District Court cited Cohen v.
Comm’r, 910 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1990) in support of its
holding that the retroactive application of the 1984 method
of valuing gifts made before 1984 was proper in that the
method was consistent with the valuation rules passed by
Congress for gifts after 1984. Schusterman v. U.S., 63
F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995), aff’g, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,161 (N.D. Okla. 1994).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayer transferred stock in a closely-held corporation to a
spouse, subject to a buy-sell agreement. Under the
agreement, the taxpayer and the corporation had a right of
first refusal to repurchase the shares at fair market value if
(1) the spouse decided to sell the shares, (2) the taxpayer
and spouse divorced, or (3) the spouse died and did not will
the stock to the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the transfer of
stock to the spouse qualified for the federal gift tax marital
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9606008, Nov. 9, 1995.
VALUATION. The taxpayers, husband and wife, each
established several grantor-retained annuity trusts funded
with corporate stock. The annuities required quarterly
payments of income; however, the stock had a history of no
dividends and the taxpayers anticipated that this would
continue through the term of the annuities. Therefore, the
annuities provided that the taxpayers would loan cash to the
annuities sufficient to make the required payments. The
loans charged no interest so long as the trusts were grantor
trusts. The IRS ruled that the taxpayers' retained interests
were not qualified retained annuity interests because no
amounts were payable from the trusts and the taxpayers'
retained interests in the trust were not capable of valuation
because of the loan provisions. Ltr. Rul. 9604005, Oct.
176, 1995.
The decedent had owned 50 percent of a trust which
owned two parcels of rural land zoned as residential. The
issue in the case was the highest and best use of the land for
purposes of determining the fair market value of the parcels.
The estate argued that the highest and best use of the land
was for residential purposes because the land was zoned
residential and any attempt to rezone the land for
commercial purposes would be difficult. The court held that
the evidence demonstrated that development from the
nearby town toward the parcels was commercial and that a
rezoning could be easily obtained; therefore, the fair market
value would be determined on the basis of the commercial
use value of the property. Estate of Lloyd v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-30.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned residential
property with equal undivided community property
interests. The taxpayers each transferred their own interest
in the property to separate 15 year trusts. The trusts
provided that if the grantor died before the end of 15 years,
the trust terminated and the assets reverted to the grantor's
estate. The will of each grantor passed the revested interest
to the surviving spouse. If the residence ceased to be the
personal residence of the grantor, the trust was to be
converted to an annuity trust. The IRS ruled that (1) the
residence qualified as a personal residence under Treas.
Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)(2); (2) the trusts were qualified
personal residence trusts which qualified for the exception
of I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii) to the special valuation rules of
I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2); and (3) because the value of each
grantor's retained interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of
the trust property, each grantor was considered the owner of
the trust and would include trust income, deductions and
credits against tax attributable to the trust under I.R.C. §
671. Ltr. Rul. 9606003, Nov. 7, 1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer was a 50 percent owner of
a corporation in which the taxpayer served as employee,
treasurer and vice-president. The debtor performed
engineering and accounting services for the corporation's
business. The taxpayer's salary was $30,000 per year. The
taxpayer loaned more than $600,000 to the corporation over
several years in order to offset the corporation's difficulties
with receiving payments from customers, some of which
were other entities owned by the taxpayer. When several of
the corporation's customers filed for bankruptcy, the
taxpayer claimed the debt to the corporation as a business
bad debt deduction, arguing that the loans were made to
protect the taxpayer's employment with the corporation. The
court held that the taxpayer's loans to the corporation were
made with the intent to protect the taxpayer's investment in
the corporation because the amount of the loans greatly
exceeded the taxpayer's salary and the loans also protected
the taxpayer's investments in the corporations which were
served by the corporation receiving the loans. In re Mills,
189 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).
C CORPORATIONS
ACCOUNTING METHOD. A C corporation was a
debtor in bankruptcy. The debtor had consistently used the
cash method of accounting and the IRS used that method of
accounting to determine its tax claims filed in the case. The
bankruptcy trustee argued that under I.R.C. § 448, the
debtor was required to use the accrual method of
accounting; therefore, the federal tax claim should have
been calculated using the accrual method of accounting.
The court held that under I.R.C. § 446, an unauthorized
method of accounting may be allowed if, in the opinion of
the Commissioner, income is clearly reflected by the use of
the method. In this case, the IRS agent testified that the cash
method of accounting did clearly reflect the actual income
of the corporation; therefore, the court held that the tax
claim could be determined under the cash method of
accounting. Morrissey v. IRS, 189 B.R. 821 (W.D. Okla.
1995).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. When the
taxpayer's employment was terminated, the taxpayer signed
an agreement which contained provisions prohibiting the
taxpayer from suing the employer for claims related to the
employment termination, including claims arising under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The
taxpayer received a lump sum payment representing 49
weeks of wages. The taxpayer excluded the payment from
income, arguing that the payment was received in
settlement of tort-like claims. The court held that the
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payment was severance pay includible in income. Webb v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-50.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The taxpayer
operated several businesses, including a law practice and
several farms, which were operated by several corporations
or by the taxpayer as sole proprietor. Although the taxpayer
did not provide any direct evidence of the basis of a pickup
truck used in one of the farms and for the law practice, the
court determined that some basis did exist from the
evidence that the taxpayer paid interest on a loan used to
purchase the truck. The taxpayer was not allowed
depreciation deductions for a tractor and other farm
implements used on another farm because no evidence was
presented that the taxpayer owned these items or that they
were used in the taxpayer's sole proprietorship businesses
and not in the businesses operated by the corporations. Hall
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-27.
The IRS has issued tables, revised for inflation, detailing
the limitation on depreciation deductions for automobiles
first placed in service during 1996:
   Tax Year      Amount  
1st tax year ........................................... $3,060
2d tax year..............................................4,900
3d tax year..............................................2,950
Each succeeding year ............................. 1,775
The IRS also issued tables providing the amounts to be
included in income for automobiles first leased during 1996.
Rev. Proc. 96-25.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The taxpayer was an officer
and 51 percent shareholder of one corporation and 98
percent shareholder of a subsidiary corporation. The
subsidiary purchased two paid-up life insurance policies on
the life of the taxpayer. The policies were issued to a trust
as owner and the trust entered into a split-dollar agreement
with the subsidiary under which the trust agreed to repay
the premium amounts paid by the subsidiary. The
agreement was to terminate if (1) the subsidiary ceased to
operate or filed for bankruptcy, (2) the taxpayer's
employment terminated, or (3) the trust or taxpayer
requested termination of the agreement. If the agreement
terminated prior to the death of the taxpayer, the subsidiary
would still receive reimbursement for premiums paid from
the cash surrender value of the policy. The IRS ruled that
Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11 and Rev. Rul. 66-110,
1966-1 C.B. 12 applied to require that the taxpayer must
include in income the value of the cost-free insurance
provided by the agreement plus any increase in the cash
surrender value which exceeded the premiums paid by the
subsidiary. For determining the value of the cost-free
insurance to the taxpayer, the IRS referred the taxpayer to
Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228 and Rev. Rul. 67-154,
1967-1 C.B. 11. Ltr. Rul. 9604001, Sept. 8, 1995.
EXCISE TAX ON TRUCKS. The taxpayer
manufactured a semitrailer truck which was capable of
loading and transporting round and square bales of hay.
Although the vehicle was capable of traveling on highways
at highway speeds, the vehicle could not be operated at
night on highways and required special length, width and
weight permits for most highway travel. The IRS ruled that
(1) for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 48.4061(a)-1(d)(2)(ii)(A),
the semitrailer was specially designed for the primary
function of transporting hay other than over the highway;
(2) the permits needed to use the vehicle loaded on the
highway substantially impaired the vehicle's usage on
highways for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 48.4061(a)-
1(d)(2)(ii)(B); and (3) the vehicle came within the exception
to the definition of highway vehicle under Treas. Reg. §
48.4061(a)-1(d)(2)(ii) and was not subject to the tax of
I.R.C. § 4051(a)(1).  Ltr. Rul. 9605007, Nov. 3, 1995.
FALSE RETURNS. The taxpayer had lost two farms to
foreclosure. In an attempt to strike back at persons and
entities which the taxpayer held responsible for the
foreclosures, the taxpayer sent fictitious bills for rent to
these parties.. The taxpayer claimed the billed amounts as
income and claimed withheld taxes from the bills. The
taxpayer filed for income tax refunds based on the fictitious
income and withheld taxes. The taxpayer was convicted of
willfully filing false returns. The taxpayer appealed the
conviction on the basis that the jury instruction regarding
willfulness was erroneous in that it allowed the jury to
consider the reasonableness of the taxpayer's belief that the
taxes and deductions claimed were legitimate. The court
held that the jury could consider the reasonableness of the
taxpayer's beliefs in determining whether the beliefs were
held in good faith. United States v. Hilgeford, 96-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,068 (7th Cir. 1996).
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was a plastic surgeon
employed by a corporation wholly-owned by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer claimed that the taxpayer purchased farmland
and horses to be trained as polo ponies with the intent to
attract potential patients for the plastic surgery practice. The
farmland, horses and equipment were purchased with the
taxpayer's own funds and the taxpayer failed to produce any
evidence that the polo pony business did attract any patients
for the plastic surgery business. The court held that the two
businesses could not be combined for purposes of
determining the profitability of the horse farm. The court
then examined the nine factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)
to determine whether the horse farm was operated with the
intent to make a profit. The court found that (1) the taxpayer
did not keep adequate records or create a plan to make the
operation profitable, (2) the taxpayer did not have sufficient
expertise for operating a profitable polo pony training
operation, (3) the taxpayer did not have a reasonable
expectation of eventual profit from appreciation, (4) the
farm had an extensive history of continuing and increasing
losses, (5) the taxpayer had substantial income from the
plastic surgery business, and (6) the taxpayer used the farm
for primarily recreational purposes as part of the taxpayer's
interest in playing polo. The court held that the polo pony
farm activity was not entered into with the intent to make a
profit and disallowed deductions in excess of income from
the activity. Wilkinson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-39.
The taxpayer was employed fulltime as a veterinarian.
The taxpayer purchased a farm and raised cattle for several
years, but during the tax years in question, no farming or
ranching operations occurred on the farm. However, oil was
discovered on the property and the taxpayer entered into a
royalty agreement with an oil production company which
paid the taxpayer a royalty free of all production expenses.
The taxpayer hired a manager who lived on the farm and
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maintained the property but the manager performed no
activities which affected the oil production. The taxpayers
claimed the farm expenses against the oil income. The court
held that because no farming operations were conducted on
the farm, the expenses incurred by the taxpayer were not
ordinary and necessary business expenses and were
disallowed. The court also held that the expenses were
unrelated to the oil production since the income received
from the oil was free of production expense to the taxpayer
and none of the manager's activities were related to the oil
production. The taxpayer argued that deductions should
have been allowed to the extent of the appreciation in the
value of the farm. The court held that, under Treas. Reg. §
1.183-1(d)(1), a farming activity can be combined with
holding land for investment only if the net farm income was
sufficient to reduce the cost of retaining the land. Because
the taxpayer only had net losses, farm expenses could not be
claimed as an expense based on appreciation of the land.
The taxpayer also purchased another farm which was used
for a variety of farm and ranch operations, most of which
ended with the taxpayer donating the livestock to a
charitable organization. The taxpayer did not keep separate
records for the farm nor did the taxpayer make any plan to
determine the profitability of the various activities. The
taxpayer formed an S corporation to operate that farm. The
taxpayer did not have any expertise in the types of livestock
operations attempted and did not seek expert advice. The
taxpayer argued that because the Tax Court had not found
any element of recreation or pleasure from the taxpayer's
operation of the second farm, the farm must have been
either a business or other profit-seeking activity. The court
held that the recreation or pleasure element was only one of
nine factors involved and held that on the basis of the other
factors, the Tax Court's holding that the second farm was
not operated with the intent to make a profit was not clearly
erroneous. Westbrook v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 868 (5th Cir.
1995).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
CONTRIBUTIONS. A limited partnership was
composed of an individual 99 percent limited partner and an
S corporation as 1 percent general partner. The shareholders
of the corporation were all siblings and the individual
limited partner was a parent of the shareholders. The
shareholders contributed identical portfolios of cash and
marketable securities to the corporation which contributed a
portion of the assets to the partnership. The portfolios
satisfied the diversification standard of I.R.C. §
368(a)(2)(F)(ii). The limited partner also contributed stock
and securities to the partnership sufficient to maintain the
respective interests in the partnership as before the
contributions. The limited partner's contributed portfolio did
not satisfy the diversification standard of I.R.C. §
368(a)(2)(F)(ii). The IRS ruled that the transfers of the
corporation and limited partner were not transfers to an
investment company under I.R.C. § 351(e)(1) if the
partnership was incorporated; therefore, no gain or loss
would be recognized from the transfers. Ltr. Rul. 9606007,
Nov. 9, 1995.
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer received a check
from a former employer's profit-sharing retirement plan
almost two years after termination of employment. The
taxpayer did not know about or contribute to the plan. The
taxpayer deposited the check into the taxpayer's bank
account and several months later sent a check for part of the
amount back to the former employer, apparently as a
belated investment in the plan.  The court held that the
distribution check was all included in the taxpayer's income
because the taxpayer did not make any contribution to the
plan before the distribution and did not roll over the
distribution to a qualified retirement plan. Silver v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-42.
For plans beginning in January 1996, the weighted
average is 7.05 percent with the permissible range of 6.35 to
7.62 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable range) and 6.35
to 7.76 percent (90 to 110  percent permissable range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-9, I.R.B. 1996-6, 26. Note:
The IRS has issued two notices numbered as 96-9.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The petitioner
was a shareholder of a dissolved S corporation. The
corporation had designated another shareholder as the tax
matters person for several years. The tax matters person
signed an extension of time for the IRS to file a Notice
Final S Corporation Administrative Adjustment as to the
corporation. Prior to the signing, no other person had been
designated as tax matters person, the tax matters person had
not resigned, nor had the corporation revoked the tax
matters person's designation. Therefore, the court held that
the tax matters person was authorized to sign the extension.
The decision has been designated as not for publication.
Praxiteles, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,049 (9th Cir. 1996).
WITHHOLDING TAXES. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations relating to when amounts deferred
under or paid from certain nonqualified deferred
compensation plans are taken into account as wages for
purposes of the employment taxes imposed by FICA and
FUTA. 61 Fed. Reg. 2194 (Jan. 25, 1996).
NEGLIGENCE
HERBICIDES. The plaintiffs were cotton growers
whose cotton fields were damaged from the drifting on to
their land of herbicides aerially sprayed on neighboring
land. The plaintiffs included as defendants in their suit for
damages the sellers of the herbicides to the aerial sprayer
and the owners of the sprayed properties. The plaintiffs
claimed liability of the sellers rested on negligence per se
because the sellers sold the herbicides to an unlicensed
applicator in violation of law. The court held that no statute
or administrative regulation prohibited the selling of
registered herbicides to unlicensed applicators. The
administrative regulations did require the sellers to report
all sales of herbicides and the report forms did have a space
for the license number of the purchaser, but the regulations
did not prohibit the sales if no license number was provided.
The court also held that even if the sale to an unlicensed
applicator was prohibited and the sale of the herbicide was
negligence per se, the sale of the herbicide was not a direct
cause of the damage to the plaintiffs' cotton crops;
therefore, the sellers were not liable for the damage. The
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plaintiffs also alleged that one seller violated federal law, 7
U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(F), (G), in that the seller did not "use"
the federally registered herbicide in compliance with the
label instructions when the seller sold the herbicide to an
unlicensed applicator. The court held that the seller did not
violate federal law in that (1) the sale of a herbicide was not
a "use" of the herbicide and (2) the label allowed the sale of
the herbicide to "commercial agricultural personnel" and
did not restrict the sale only to licensed herbicide
applicators. Ward v. Northeast Texas Farmers Co-op.
Elev., 909 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App. 1995).
PROPERTY
FENCES. The plaintiff owned land at the edge of a city
and the defendant owned neighboring land just outside the
city limits such that the property line between the two
properties was the city limits. The defendant raised
miniature horses on the property. The defendant requested
the rural township trustees to mediate a dispute as to who
should maintain the fence. The fence viewers ruled that
each party would be required to maintain about half of the
fence. The plaintiff appealed to the District Court which
held that the application of Iowa Code Chapter 359A was
unconstitutional in that the plaintiff received no benefit
from the fence because the plaintiff did not use the property
for raising livestock and because the defendant received a
benefit unrelated to any governmental interest. The
appellate court reversed, holding that a disparity between
the benefits received by landowners separated by a mutual
fence was not sufficient to make the fence law
unconstitutional. In addition, the court held that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that maintaining a portion of the fence
was unduly oppressive which would amount to an
unconstitutional exercise of governmental authority. The
plaintiff also argued that the "home rule" statute, Iowa Code
§ 364.1, preempted the fence statute and applied here
because the plaintiff lived within the city limits. The court
held that the "home rule" law could not be applied where it
conflicted with other law. Gravert v. Nebergall, 539
N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1995).
HUNTERS. The defendant was a manager of a farm.
The defendant confronted a party of hunters who were on a
section line on the farm property. The hunters claimed that
the defendant took pictures and drove a vehicle around them
in a effort to prevent their successful hunting in the area.
The defendant was convicted, under S.D. Cod. Laws § 41-
9-8, of intentionally interfering with lawful hunting. The
defendant argued that the hunters were not lawfully hunting,
under S.D. Cod. Laws § 41-9-1.1. In order to get to the
hunting area, the hunters traveled along a section line
which, by statute, is a public highway unless vacated or
abandoned. There was no evidence that the section line
highway was vacated or abandoned in this case. However,
lawful hunting can occur on a section line without the
approval of the adjoining property owner only if the section
line was improved for vehicular travel or was commonly
used by the public for vehicular travel. In this case, a farm
path created by the defendant's machinery was the only
"improvement" to the section line and the hunters had to
leave their vehicles because of marshy land in order to
reach the hunting area. The court held that the farm path
was not an improvement for vehicular travel; therefore, the
hunters were not lawfully hunting and the defendant could
not be convicted of interfering with lawful hunting. State v.
Tracy, 539 N.W.2d 327 (S.D. 1995).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
OWNERSHIP. The plaintiff claimed ownership of a
farm tractor in which the defendant claimed a security
interest through a security agreement covering farm
equipment owned by the plaintiff's son. The tractor was
purchased by the plaintiff using a tractor owned by the
plaintiff's son as downpayment. The tractor was delivered to
the son and the son gave the plaintiff a promissory note for
part of the purchase price. The plaintiff paid for about half
of the cost of the tractor. The son did pay off the note,
claimed the tractor as a personal asset on financial
statements, and claimed the depreciation deductions on
federal income tax returns. The jury ruled for the plainitff
and the trial court denied a motion by the defendant for
judgment notwithstandiing the verdict. The lower appellate
court held that the plaintiff did not retain any ownership
interest in the tractor and did not perfect any purchase
money security interest in the tractor by filing or
possession; therefore, the tractor was owned by the son and
was subject to the defendant's security interest. Therefore, a
denial of the defendant's motion was improper. The
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding that there
remained an issue of fact as to whether the plainitff had
given title to the tractor to the son; therefore, the denial of
the motion was proper. Melcher v. Bank of Madison, 539
N.W.2d 837 (Neb. 1995), rev'g, 529 N.W.2d 814 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1995).
REPOSSESSION. The debtor had granted a security
interest in the debtor's registered shorthorn cattle to a
creditor. The debtor defaulted on the loan secured by the
cattle and after some delay while the debtor sought other
financing, the creditor repossessed the cattle without notice
to the debtor, as allowed by the security agreement. The
creditor placed the cattle under the care of other ranchers
while the creditor sought foreclosure. The debtor alleged
that the repossession was improper and that the creditor
failed to properly care for the cattle after repossession. The
evidence showed that the caretakers failed to properly feed
the cattle and bred the cattle indiscriminately, without
preserving or recording the lineage of the calves born after
the repossession. The court held that the repossession was
proper because the lack of notice was allowed by the
security agreement, the creditor did give the debtor time to
cure the default, and no evidence was presented that the
creditor repossessed the cattle with any intent to harm the
debtor. The court also held that the debtor suffered damages
to the value of the cattle and calves from the creditor's
failure to properly feed and breed the cattle during its
possession of the cattle. The court recognized the special
value and needs of registered cattle and allowed the debtor
an offset for damage to the cattle and calves against the
creditor's claim. In re Krug, 189 B.R. 948 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1995).
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STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The taxpayer owned 11.75
acres in the city of Eagan which were unoccupied and
dormant from 1960 through March 1993. In January 1993,
the land was classified as industrial land. In April 1993, the
taxpayer cash leased the land to a farmer who planted and
harvested vegetables. Under Minn. Stat. § 273.111, the
green acre statute, land may be eligible for special valuation
and tax deferment if the land is agricultural land, meaning a
"contiguous acreage of ten acres of more, primarily used
during the preceding year for agricultural purposes." The
court held that because the land was dormant in 1992, the
land did not qualify for the green acres status in 1993. A
footnote states that the county assessor did allow green acre
status for the land in 1994. McLean v. County of Dakota,
540 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Kurz v. Comm’r, 68 F.3d 1028  (7th Cir.
1995), aff'g, 101 T.C. 44 (1993) (power of appointment)
see Vol. 6, p. 182.
White v. Comm’r, 906 F. Supp. 24 (D. Mass. 1995),
vac’g, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,200 (D. Mass.
1995) (transfers within three years of death), see Vol . 6, p.
157.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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